What Happened
Between October 14 and October 26, an attacker accessed AWS accounts of multiple Qubole customers, stealing stored secrets and data. This breach was reported by Wiz and detected by Sentra in several customer environments.
Qubole, a data lake platform owned by Idera, operates within customer AWS accounts. Customers create an IAM role with a trust policy allowing Qubole's AWS account to assume it. The attacker used credentials from Qubole's AWS account to access these customer accounts. How these credentials were obtained remains undisclosed.
Most of the roles the attacker assumed were unused, yet they still trusted Qubole's account, allowing the requests to succeed.
Timeline
- October 8 to 11: A separate attacker used AWS access keys, believed to be set up for Qubole, to compromise some cloud environments. This activity is not linked to the AssumeRole abuse.
- October 14 to 26: The AssumeRole campaign occurred. Each attacker request had a valid External ID and was accepted.
- From October 18: The attacker used a second IAM user that Qubole's normal traffic also uses, complicating detection.
- Disclosure: Neither Qubole nor Idera had released a public statement when the breach was reported. It's unclear if the credentials have been disabled.
Inside victim accounts, the attacker accessed Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager, and SSM Parameter Store values, testing them with TruffleHog. The stolen data included AWS access keys, Entra ID client secrets, and Okta client credentials. The attacker also copied data from S3, sometimes downloading entire buckets in one session.
Which Controls Failed or Were Missing
Outdated Trust Policies: Dormant roles still trusted the vendor's account, providing standing access without oversight.
Misuse of External ID: The External ID, meant to prevent the confused deputy problem, isn't a secret. It's visible in CloudTrail and often stored in vendor files. Once the attacker had the vendor's credentials, the External ID was ineffective.
Lack of Network Constraints: A source IP condition could have blocked the observed role assumptions. Qubole's legitimate traffic came from AWS, while the attacker used OVH-hosted addresses and Mullvad VPN endpoints.
Overbroad Permissions: Vendor roles often have extensive access for convenience. Qubole's setup guide includes a sample S3 policy allowing read access to every bucket, turning one compromised credential into broad access to sensitive data.
Account-wide Trust Principals: Trusting the vendor's account-wide
:rootprincipal allows any identity in that account to attempt assumption, not just the intended one.Insufficient Logging: CloudTrail records AssumeRole calls and bucket listings but not specific S3 objects accessed. Without S3 data events or server access logs, responders couldn't determine which objects were taken.
Static Access Keys: The earlier activity involved long-lived AWS access keys, lacking the session scoping that roles offer.
What the Relevant Standards Require
ISO 27036 addresses information security in supplier relationships, expecting acquirers to define and restrict supplier access, manage it throughout the relationship, and terminate it when necessary.
SR 23-4 provides similar guidance for banking organizations, covering risk assessment, due diligence, contract negotiation, Continuous Monitoring of Active Arrangements, and termination. Dormant roles trusting a vendor indicate a termination failure; missing object-level logging is a monitoring failure.
The EBA Outsourcing Guidelines and EBA Guidelines on Sound Management of Third-Party Risk require controlled access, monitoring, and exit arrangements for providers supporting Critical or Important Functions. The common theme is access revocation at the end of the relationship and continuous monitoring during it. Neither was effective here.
Lessons and Action Items for Your Team
Conduct a Thorough Investigation: Check CloudTrail from October 1 onward in every account with a Qubole role, even if you no longer use the product. Look for AssumeRole requests where userIdentity.accountId is 805246085872 and the source address is outside AWS. Also, check for principal ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS, session names starting with quiam-, the TruffleHog user agent on GetCallerIdentity calls, and the OVH and Mullvad addresses researchers published. Mullvad addresses are shared with other VPN users, so a match alone isn't conclusive.
If a Role Was Assumed: Rotate every secret, parameter, and Lambda environment variable it could access, and revoke the role's active sessions. Rotation doesn't end sessions already issued.
Close the Security Gaps:
- Delete vendor roles you no longer need, or remove the vendor account from the trust policy.
- Replace the
:rootprincipal with the specific IAM principal the vendor uses, where supported. - Add
aws:SourceIporaws:SourceVpceconditions to limit AssumeRole to the vendor's documented ranges. - Rotate the External ID and use a unique value per role. Don't rely on it as your only control.
- Audit what each vendor role can access. Restrict Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda configuration, and blanket S3 read unless necessary.
- Alert on AssumeRole from a vendor account arriving through a VPN or a hosting provider the vendor hasn't used before.
- Enable an organization trail across all accounts and regions, plus S3 data events or server access logs for sensitive buckets.
Improve Your Processes: Add IAM trust relationships to your vendor inventory so each role maps to a named vendor, an owner, and a review date. Make role removal a required step in your Wind-Down Plan for every cloud-integrated vendor. During Criticality Classification, rate vendors higher when their access is within your cloud tenancy with read access to secrets. A Pre-Contractual Assessment should ask if the vendor supports source-IP-restricted, least-privilege trust policies, and if it can scope access to named principals rather than an account root.
The attacker didn't defeat AWS. They used access you had already granted to a vendor you may have stopped monitoring.




